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2Abstract
Recent studies [2, 3] argue that traditional voting systems do not
encourage increased voter participation due to constraints in time,
location, accuracy, and, accessibility. To ensure the rights of a demo-
cratic society and to enhance and secure the voting rights of citizens
by surpassing all the limitations of the traditional voting system, the
development of an electronic voting system is an attractive solution.
Research on secure electronic voting systems has been conducted for
at least the past two decades. We propose to develop an electronic
voting system, called the Rochester Institute of Technology Student
Government Election System (SGEES) based on Damgard et al [1].
This voting scheme will use efficient honest-verifier zero-knowledge,
which, unlike previous election schemes [3, 4], are both easy to com-
pute and to verify for both voters and authorities. Our proposed
electronic voting system will allow convenient and confident voting
while maintaining the accuracy of election results. This project will
address the security requirements for electronic voting over the Inter-
net, including privacy, completeness, soundness, receipt-freeness, and
universal verifiability. In particular, we will research the feasibility
of the voting scheme and protocols by studying three related crypto-
graphical theories: homomorphic encryption, efficient honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proofs, and threshold decryption cryptosystem.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Goals and Objectives of Research
The concept of Internet-based voting promises convenience for voters and
an inexpensive voting method for a modern democratic society. Researchers
have proposed [3, 4] voting schemes that, theoretically speaking, support
Internet-based voting. However, due to the difficulty of implementing the
necessary security requirements, only a few actual schemes for supporting
Internet-based voting have been developed, and these make impractically,
strong assumptions about the voting environment, such as anonymous or un-
tappable communication channels [12]. In order to implement an electronic
voting system, the following security concerns must be addressed: voter’s
privacy, anonymity, completeness, soundness, unreusability, eligibility, ro-
bustness, universal verifiability, and, receipt-freeness. The most crucial of
these security properties to practical voting schemes are universal verifiabil-
ity and receipt-freeness [12]. One way to satisfy these security requirements is
to adopt a set of cryptographic protocols and a bulletin board [1]. A bulletin
board allows voters to correspond with trusted authorities via public chan-
nels. Previous approaches based on this framework include the homomorphic
encryption scheme [4] and the blind signature and mix-net scheme [3]. How-
ever, the later two schemes may introduce significant delay and difficulty in
implementation.
We propose to study and implement a practical voting system based
on homomorphic public-key cryptosystems with threshold decryption using
efficient honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs for correctness of encrypted
votes. Furthermore, we state the theoretical soundness of our scheme and
propose the implementation of this scheme for the RIT Student Government
Election System. In the process of implementation, we will explore how to
improve the voting scheme [1] to satisfy all security requirements. We will
also address and document the limitations in all components of our system.
We expect that this project will lead to a publication and/or presentation at
a conference.
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2 Cryptographic preliminaries
This section describes of the security requirements of cryptographic primi-
tives for the Internet-based voting system.
2.1 Security requirements
In order to implement the Internet-based voting system, the following secu-
rity requirements must be addressed.
Eligibility: Only an eligible voter can cast a vote, and each voter can only
cast a single vote. The vote of an invalid voter is not counted.
Privacy: Votes remain anonymous; each individual vote is protected against
coercion. Different ballots are indistinguishable irrespective of the con-
tained votes.
Completeness: All valid votes must be secret and be counted in the final
tally.
Unreusability: A voter cannot vote twice.
Robustness: The voting system must be working properly even though the
partial failure of the system occurs.
Universal Verifiability: A third party can check whether or not ballots
are correctly cast, and only invalid ballots are ignored.
Receipt-Freeness: A voter cannot prove which candidate he vote. Conse-
quently, voters are not able to sell their votes to the buyers.
2.2 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption establishes universal verifiability in the election
system by generating a new encrypted vote from the product of two votes.
The “product” of the ciphertexts of any two votes is the ciphertext of the
“sum” of the votes. The idea behind the homomorphic property is that
ciphertext of the sum of the ciphertexts of the votes can be decrypted each
encrypted vote. Results of the election can, with the help of the appropriate
private key, be computed efficiently [4]. A general definition of the notation is
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as follows. For any instance E of the encryption scheme and given messages,
m1 and m2.
E(m1)⊗ E(m2) = E(m1 ⊕m2) (1)
Homomorphic encryption is important to the construction of voting pro-
tocols. The ElGamal style cryptosystem can be modified to this homomor-
phic encryption under the generalized Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption
(DDH) and using the standard binomial expansion [1].
2.3 Bulletin board
A bulletin board is a public broadcast channel with memory, which is used
our voting system for all communication between voters and authorities. Any
information on the bulletin board can be read by any third party and it can
be monitored publicly. The bulletin board, however, does not allow any party
to erase any information on the board. Only a valid voter can append an
encrypted vote in his/her part of the board section. Each column of the
bulletin board for a voter consists of four fields: challenge, response, ballot,
and a proof as follows.
Challenge field: The verifier posts the challenge value.
Response field: Voter gives the response value to the verifier.
Proof field: The verifier propels the proof of validity for the final ballot.
Ballot field: Voter posts the final ballot.
The bulletin board will execute the interactive proof of validity with vot-
ers in the challenge, response, and proof fields during the voting scheme. At
the end of the validity proof, the bulletin board posts the proof of validity of
the final ballot on the ballot field. In order to gain access to the various fields
of the bulletin board, each voter must be identified by a digital signature.
2.4 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs based on an interactive proof system allow a prover to
convince it has secret knowledge to a verifier without revealing the prover’s
secret itself. In the voting system, a prover (voter) wants to convince the
verifier (tallying) of the correctness of an encrypted vote in such a way that
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the verifier cannot learn from the prover’s ballot information. In general,
zero-knowledge proofs are not suitable for this purpose due to the number
of rounds with large computational complexity. Required to reach a con-
clusion of Damga¨rd, proposed efficient honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge having a constant number of rounds. His results can also be
applied to non-interactive proofs such as those having a cryptographic hash
function h based on Fiat-Shamir heuristic
∑
-protocols [1]. Zero-knowledge
proofs can also show the validity of votes encrypted via a homomorphic en-
cryption scheme.
2.5 Threshold decryptions system
In a (t, n) threshold protocol, a trusted party selects a secret key, S, and
distributes shares of S to n members. Any group of t members which pool
their shares should then be able to recover the secret S. A (t,n) threshold
scheme based on Lagrange interpolation was developed by Shamir [13]. If the
members are less than t of members, then they cannot receive any information
about the secret S. The main components of a threshold decryption model
are as follows.
i. A key generation protocol by a trusted third authority. The trusted third
authority distributes the private/public keys voters and tallying servers.
ii. A decryption protocol by threshold ElGamal cryptosystem. To decrypt
a ciphertext c a main tallying server forwards the ciphertext to the
tallying servers. Using their shared secret keys, each tallying server
runs the decryption algorithm and outputs a part of decryption c with
the validity proofs. Finally, the main tallying server uses the combining
algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext if the partial decryptions are valid.
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3 System Architecture
The Internet-based voting system is divided into three main components:
registration, validation, and tallying. Distributed servers will support the
voting scheme for the RIT SGEES as shown in Figure 1. Our system will
have the following features.
1. A voter’s client application provides a user-friendly interface.
2. Trusted authorities will allow the voters to be authenticated via their
votes, using zero-knowledge proofs.
3. The votes will be securely transmitted from the voters to the tallying
servers via the bulletin board without revealing any voter’s private
information.
4. The tallying servers will count the ballots securely and will print the
results of the election on the bulletin board.
5. Client will be executed on the PC of the Internet enabling the com-
munication with the authority, to cast the vote and verify the final
tally.
6. Distributed servers will verify the voter’s vote, collect, and count them
correctly.
Both Java and Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) will
be used for carrying out the development and storing encrypted ballots and
user’s information. Our project will be portable to multiple platforms.
3.1 Registration
Before the election (as shown in Figure 2), a voter must prove his identity
and eligibility. We will use the ElGamal cryptosystem, which is based on
Decision Diffie-Hellman Assumptions along with the Homomorphic Encryp-
tion Property suggested by Damga¨rd et al [1].
The scenario of the registration is as follows: each voter can encrypt
a ballot with the public key of a trusted tallying server. A trusted admin
server distributes the public and private keys. Before the voter submits an
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 9
encrypted ballot to the bulletin board, the trusted registration server will
authenticate the voter’s eligibility and ensure the uniqueness of the vote. In
the process, the homomorphic encryption model will be used.
3.2 Validation
After registration (as shown in Figure 3), the validation process on the bul-
letin board ensures that each encrypted vote is valid. The correctness of
the encrypted vote will be validated using honest-verifier zero-knowledge
proofs [3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11] that reveal nothing about the secret information of
the voter. We will address the following properties of honest-verifier zero-
knowledge proofs.
• Completeness: The Verifier will accept the proof with very high prob-
ability if the Prover knows secret information, called a witness, from
which a proof can be built.
• Special Soundness: If the Prover does not know any witness, and
performs any probabilistic algorithm. The Verifier will reject a proof
attempt with a very high probability.
• Honest-verifier zero-knowledge: It is possible to generate a tran-
script, indistinguishable from a valid proof protocol, without interact-
ing with the Prover. It ensures that an honest verifier does not gain
any knowledge about the witness that is available to the Prover.
3.3 Tallying
At the end of the voting period (as shown in Figure 4), all votes are counted
correctly and securely by decrypting the final encrypted ballot. This can be
done by secret-sharing scheme among a set of authorities. In a (t,n) threshold
cryptosystem [5, 6, 7, 8], it is required that a private key is shared among n
tallying servers, and the decryption is possible only when at least t tallying
servers cooperate with each other. The idea behind a threshold cryptosystem
is to keep the private key with a fault-tolerant technique and to distribute
the functionality of cryptographic protocols to establish robustness. The
tallying process can be shared among n tallying servers by using a (t,n)
threshold public key decryption system. Each one of the n tallying servers
has a share of the private key. And each voter encrypts his vote with the
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public-key of the tallying servers. The final tallying server can decrypt the
encrypted vote by using t tallying servers which are cooperating with each
other. It provides privacy of the votes and accuracy of the tally if at least t
tallying servers are provided.
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4 Deliverables
4.1 Source code with javadoc documentation
1. All cryptographic protocols in the election system
2. Registration mechanism
3. Bulletin board mechanism
4. Tallying servers mechanism
5. Trusted servers mechanism
4.2 Documentation and analysis of security consider-
ations
1. Complete technical specification and documentation of the design and
implementation of the election system and cryptographic algorithms,
including justification for choices made.
2. Analysis of security considerations such as homomorphic encryption,
honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs, and threshold cryptosystem.
3. Formal conclusions regarding scalability and security of the system,
with justification for all conclusions and results collected.
4. Working demonstration of the voting system and performance analysis
for computational and communication complexities.
5. Five tallying servers, one registration and authentication server, and
one bulletin board server at workstation level will be used in the Com-
puter Science Department labs.
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4.3 Experiments & Testing
The experiments and testing of the electronic voting system will consist of
three parts: registration, bulletin board, and tallying. Each part will be
included in the evaluation of the cryptographic protocols corresponding to
the activity tested as follows.
1. Registration
The registration’s tests will include evaluations to verify eligible vot-
ers, store the voter’s information, and interact with the trusted admin
server to gain public keys for the voters.
2. Bulletin board
The bulletin board’s tests will include the activity evaluations: proving
the validity of encrypted votes, processing zero-knowledge properties,
and interacting with trusted admin server to verify there were no double
votes under zero-knowledge proofs.
3. Tallying servers
The tallying’s tests will comprise the activity evaluations: homomor-
phic encryption, shares of private key among the tallying servers, and
decryptions of the final encrypted votes.
4.4 Draft thesis contents
I. Abstract
II. Introduction
III. Related works
IV. Cryptographic primitives
V. Design specification
VI. Implementation
VII. Results
VIII. Result analysis
IX. Conclusions
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X. Appendix
XI. References
4.5 Proposed Schedule
Winter 2003, Research
Activity Description Estimated Dates
Analysis of existing electronic voting systems Dec 1 - Dec 20
Feasibility of known theoretical voting schemes Dec 21 - Jan 22
Research cryptographic protocols and schemes Jan 23 - Feb 22
Spring 2004 , Implementation and experiments
Implementation of the proposed election system Feb 23 - April 10
experiments and testing April 11 - May 5
Summer 2004, writing thesis
Writing thesis, final experiments May 6 - July 10
Thesis defense By the end of July
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